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FEATURE | SERVING DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN
 The Plaintiffs alleged that the State was in violation of the Education Clause by failing
to provide funding necessary for an adequate education for certain students.
ing on the Opportunity Funding pro- gram that Governor Carney announced in 2019, the parties agreed to a comprehen- sive package of school-funding reform that included, most notably, making Opportu- nity Funding a permanent feature of state funding for public schools.45 The reforms were adopted by the General Assembly in the session that concluded on June 30, 2021.46 The case against the State Defen- dants was dismissed, without prejudice, on August 16, 2021.47
VII. Conclusion
Although it was adopted more than a century ago, the Education Clause continues to represent the State’s com- mitment to providing a free public edu- cation to all of Delaware’s school-age children. 
NOTES
1. The Rodel Foundation, Delaware Public Education at a Glance at 1, 6 (2021), available at https://rodelde.org/ataglance/flipbook%20 2021_%20all%20pages_digital.pdf (the “2021 Rodel Report”).
2. Id. at 25-26.
3. Gov. Carney: Delawareans for Educational Opportunity, DE NAACP Agreement Makes Significant Investment in DE Schools, https:// news.delaware.gov/2020/10/12/gov-carney- delawareans-for-educational-opportunity-de- naacp-agreement-makes-significant-investment- in-de-schools.
4. The authors gratefully acknowledge the work of now-Chancellor Kathaleen S. McCormick, who directed and supervised the extensive legislative history research as a partner representing the State Defendants. For more detailed information on the legislative history, please see the Opening Brief in Support of the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, In re Delaware Public Schools Litigation, C.A. No. 2018-0029-JTL (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2018) (Dkt. 20), and the Court’s November 27, 2018 opin- iondenyingthatmotiontodismiss(Dkt.62). 5. Maurice A. Hartnett, III, Delaware’s Char- ters and Prior Constitutions, in The Delaware Constitutionof1897:TheFirstOneHundred Years 34 (Randy J. Holland & Harvey Bernard Rubenstein eds., 1997) [hereinafter First 100 Years].
6. Del. Const. of 1776.
7. Del. Const. of 1792, art. VIII, § 12; Del. Const. of 1831, art. VII, § 11.
8. Stephen B. Weeks, History of Public School Education in Delaware 23-38 (1917) [hereinaf- ter History of Public Schools].
9. Husbands v. Talley, 47 A. 1009, 1010 (Del. Super. 1901); Weeks, History of Public Schools, at 43.
10. Id. at 44.
 V. Judicial Decisions Construing the Education Clause
Few decisions by Delaware courts have addressed the meaning and con- struction of the Education Clause. The Delaware Supreme Court first ad- dressed the Education Clause in 1919,37 in In re School Code of 1919, defining the term “general,” as used in the Educa- tion Clause, as follows:
To be constitutional, [the School Code of 1919] must have been general. To be general it must provide for free public schools for all of the children of the State. A general law providing for the establishment and mainte- nance of a system, uniform or oth- erwise, of free public schools and made applicable to every school district, town or city, incorporated or otherwise . . . would if properly enacted be a valid exercise of this constitutional mandate.38
Delaware courts reaffirmed this un-
39
a violation of the Education Clause by “State Defendants” (Gov. Carney; Sec- retary of Education Susan Bunting; and then-State Treasurer Kenneth Simpler, in their official capacities). The Plaintiffs alleged that the State was in violation of the Education Clause by failing to pro- vide funding necessary for an adequate education for low-income students, students with disabilities, and English learners.41
Like school finance litigation throughout the country,42 the Delaware case raised many complex issues of law and fact, including whether the Educa- tion Clause includes an “adequacy” re- quirement and whether the Plaintiffs’ claims raised non-justiciable issues that were not within the Court’s jurisdic- tion. In November 2018, the Court issued a 133-page ruling denying the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.43 The Court explained that it viewed the Education Clause to have “a qualitative dimension” as mandating a “level of ed- ucational adequacy.” Although it con- cluded that the Plaintiffs’ claims were justiciable, the Court would “take into account and afford due deference to the political branches’ efforts to address the multi-faceted and ever-evolving chal- lenges inherent in designing and imple- menting an educational system” and recognized that “[n]o system will be perfect.”44
Following the Court’s dismissal deci- sion, the parties engaged in a mediation process before Vice Chancellor Slights that resulted in a negotiated settlement end- ingthelitigationoftheEducationClaims. That settlement included historic changes for state funding for public schools. Build-
   derstanding in subsequent decisions. Delaware courts have also noted, in passing, the General Assembly’s “ple- nary” power over public education.40 Delaware courts, however, prior to 2018 had not addressed the meaning of the term “efficient” within the context
of the Education Clause.
VI. In re Delaware Public Schools Litigation
 On January 16, 2018, the Delawar- eans for Educational Opportunity and the NAACP Delaware State Confer- ence of Branches (the “Plaintiffs”) filed suit in the Court of Chancery alleging
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